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The Niger Delta Crisis: A Focus




The government-sponsored Amnesty Programme for militants disrupting
oil production in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria has resulted in rela-
tive peace in the area. Consequently, Nigeria’s oil production which
dropped from 2.6 million barrels a day to about 1 million at the peak of
the Niger Delta crisis between 2006 and 2009 has now risen to 2.1
million barrels daily. But recent events have raised doubts as to whether
Amnesty Programme can tame the monster of militancy in the Niger
Delta. This is because post-amnesty militancy has assumed even more
frightening dimensions. The twist in the current wave of militancy, which
now extends the battle outside the creeks, going upland and sometimes
to the seats of government, portends a larger threat to the nation’s
security. This article submits that the olive branch, which the Amnesty
Programme presents, would not sufficiently assuage the restive minds
in the region. This is because anything short of owner-control or at
least owner-participation in the management of the resources of the
Niger Delta region would remain mere palliatives.
Key Words: environmental issues, resource management, amnesty, militancy,
national security.
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Résumé
Le Programme d’amnistie parrainé par le gouvernement pour les militants
qui perturbent la production de pétrole dans la région nigériane du Delta
du Niger s’est traduit par une paix relative dans la zone. En consé-
quence, la production de pétrole du Nigeria, qui avait chuté de 2,6 mil-
lions de barils par jour à environ 1 million au plus fort de la crise du Delta
du Niger, entre 2006 et 2009, est remontée à 2,1 millions de barils par
jour. Mais de récents évènements ont fait naître des doutes quant à la
capacité du Programme d’amnistie de dompter le monstre du militantisme
dans le Delta du Niger. Cela, parce que le militantisme qui a suivi l’am-
nistie a pris des dimensions encore plus effrayantes. Le changement
dans la vague de militantisme actuelle, qui porte maintenant la bataille
hors des criques, jusqu’aux hautes terres et parfois aux sièges du gou-
vernement, laisse présager d’une plus grande menace à la sécurité de la
nation. Le présent article soutient que la branche d’olivier que présente
le Programme d’amnistie ne va pas suffisamment calmer les esprits agités
dans la région. En effet, toutes mesures autres que le contrôle par les
propriétaires ou, tout au moins, la participation des propriétaires dans la
gestion des ressources de la région du Delta du Niger resteraient de
simples palliatifs.
Introduction
It is a little over a decade since Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999. Of
Nigeria’s thirty-nine years of independence up to 1999, the military ruled for
twenty-nine. The consequence has been that even in the current democratic
dispensation (that is, since 1999), vestiges of military authoritarianism are
yet apparent. The obvious gross breaches of democratic ethos since 1999
have resulted in Nigeria’s current democratic experiment being disparaged
and often described as a militarised democracy or, in the words of Al-Bashir
(2008:17), as ‘democracy which knows no rules’. The new phase of the
Niger Delta agitation is giving militant expression ‘to the fundamentally politi-
cal question that [over] fifty years of uncontrolled oil exploitation, massive
corruption, and cynical exploitation of the local communities have raised’ (Okonta
2006:3). In separate negotiations with government, the rights groups or ‘mili-
tants’, as they have come to be known, have argued that the roots of their
grouse ‘go beyond mere provision of electricity and water and focus on the
political marginalisation of the Ijaw’ who have been excluded ‘from meaning-
ful political participation in the Nigerian project’ (Okonta 2006:4).
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Recently, under President Yar’Adua, the agitations of the Niger Delta peo-
ple assumed frightening dimensions with armed combats in the Niger Delta
creeks between the militants and the Joint Task Force on the Niger Delta
(JTF) between 13 May 2009 and 4 October 2009 (the deadline for embrac-
ing the Federal Government Amnesty Programme). This outbreak of renewed
violence posed serious threat to the nation’s economy and, by implication, its
security. This paper is borne out of the need to re-examine the issues in
involved in the renewed fighting as a means of pointing up the way forward.
Okonta (2006:5) sums up saying that ‘the journey to peace and prosperity in
the region can only commence when the civic is brought back in’.
To demonstrate government’s commitment to the Niger Delta issue, within
one month of former President Yar’Adua’s assumption of office (precisely on
28 June 2007), the then Vice-President (now President) Goodluck Jonathan
visited the Ijaw towns of Okerenkoko, Oporoza and several other communities
to consult directly with the agitating leaders of the region (Amaize 2008a:14).
Immediately after this, on 2 July 2007, a Presidential Committee on Peace
and Conflict Resolution in the Niger Delta led by Senator David Brigidi was
inaugurated. Thereafter, at a Presidential Retreat for Ministers, Special Advis-
ers, and Federal Permanent Secretaries on 16 August 2007, former Presi-
dent Yar’Adua spoke of efforts to ‘get the militants’ leaders to come to the
table for dialogue’ (Agande 2007:1) with the Vice-President leading govern-
ment side. On 24 August 2007, nine nominees of the Ijaw Youth Leadership
Forum (IYLF) were inaugurated at the Presidential Villa, Abuja, to constitute a
committee for consultation on the Roadmap to Peace Implementation on the
Niger Delta.
But not long afterwards, the ceasefire in the region became threatened as
violence resumed once again, leading to attacks on oil facilities in the region.
This prompted President Yar’Adua to order the JTF on 20 June 2008, to fish
out the militants responsible for the attack What worsened the situation the
more was that the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)
had on the previous day 19 June attacked the Shell Petroleum Development
Company (SPDC) Bonga Field in Ekeremo, Bayelsa State, simultaneously
with another militants’ attacks on the Chevron-Texaco oil pipelines in the Delta
State creek settlements of Abiteye and Olero. Four days before that, militants
from Egbema had blown up Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)
pipelines at Iyera village in Edo State. The militants had called the bluff of the
President’s order to the JTF and threatened to ‘declare an oil war if the mili-
tary attacks any militant position’ (Amaize 2008b:1).
With this development, tension again heightened in the Niger Delta. The
Defence Headquarters via the JTF vowed to execute the presidential direc-
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tives, and the battle line was drawn.  A spate of militants’ attacks on oil facili-
ties raged in the creeks, and the JTF responded in counter operations which
led to the Gbaramatu Debacle that broke out on 13 May 2009. From 26 June
when government offered the militants amnesty through the 4 October dead-
line for the militants to embrace the amnesty offer, the war had dealt a crip-
pling blow on the nation’s economy as Nigeria’s crude oil production declined
from about 2 million barrels a day to about 1 million. The Amnesty Programme
had been credited for bringing some respite as peace returned to the area and
the nation returned to its former production level of crude. Not too long after-
wards, however, there was a resurge of militancy and this rightly raises the
question as to why the Amnesty Programme has been unable to assuage the
restiveness of the Niger Delta militants.
Theoretical Assumptions
In recent years, the existence of natural resources in developing countries has
been seen as a source of conflict and, therefore, a threat to national security
(Okogu 2007:56). The ‘resource curse’ theory developed by Professor Jeffery
Sachs (Okonta 2006:5) seeks to ‘explain the seeming inability of resource-
rich states in Africa and Latin America to industrialise and prosper like their
counterparts in South-East Asia’ (Okonta 2006:5). The argument is that as
authoritarian regimes (including civilian ones) deploy instruments of state at
their whims and hijack state resources, the citizens become ‘powerless spec-
tators unable to drive economic development or participate effectively in the
political arena. Poverty, corruption in high places, and religious and ethnic
violence are usually the result’ (Okonta 2006:3). All these add up to become
a threat to national security.
Resource Curse theory argue that resource-rich countries like Nigeria
inevitably degenerate into authoritarian and corrupt rule because it is
easy for the elites to hijack the oil field by force and redesign political
institutions to sustain the new regime of praetorian government (Okonta
2006:3).
Within the context of democratic theory, Page and Barabas (2000:339) con-
tend that ‘persistent gaps between the policy preferences of leaders and those
of citizens are problematic’ and thus ‘constitutes prima facie evidence that
democracy is not working well’ (Page and Barabas 2000:340). The notion of
democracy implies popular power. That is, governments’ responsiveness to
citizens’ aspirations in policy decision-making. If popular power is an infer-
ence from the postulate democracy; such an inference can only apply if the
postulate is tenable in the first place. Evidence since 1999 has shown that
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Nigeria is practising ‘militocracy’; that is a situation where democratic struc-
tures exist but the rule of law is ignored. The consequence is violence, restive-
ness, rights agitations and subsequent threat to national security. In this wise,
Okonta (2006:5) draws attention to Anna Zalik’s treatise called  ‘Petro-Vio-
lence’ and ‘Partnership Development’ whose main thrust is ‘the problematic
of development strategies devoid of democratic and participatory structures in
oil-bearing communities in the region’. While it is true that under this kind of
situation the development argument has gained priority over the democratic,
the problem is that it is becoming harder for authoritarian regimes ‘to get away
with a mode of forced development’ (Hague, Harrrop and Breslin 1988:36).
The recent phase of the Niger Delta militants-government face-off (that is,
since The Gbaramatu Debacle) was preceded at the dawn of the current demo-
cratic dispensation by a subtle agitation by oil-bearing states under the aegis
of ‘resource control’ – for a true federal structure of administration that would
ensure fiscal federalism. With no appreciable result in this regard, militant
groups began to spring up, the principal ones being the Niger Delta Peoples
Volunteer Force (NDPVF) of Asari Dokubo and the Movement for the Emanci-
pation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Even though these groups insist that their
objective ‘is to destroy the facilities that are being used to generate funds’ for
government (Amaize 2009c:8) and ‘as freedom fighters to liberate the re-
gion from the stranglehold of the Nigerian state’ (Oyadongha 2009:9), ex-
pression of high profile violence only began with government’s incarceration of
their principal officers – Asari Dokubo of the NDPVF and Henry Okah of the
MEND in 2005 and 2007 respectively. Thus, violence had not always been
there. In point of fact, when in 2003 the Movement for the Emancipation of
the Niger Delta (MEND) came into existence and in a war of attrition against
Nigeria demanded ‘a reversion of the federal structure to the old 1963 type
and a revision of the legal instruments of ownership that communalised their
privately-owned property’, their grouse was,
that the destruction of their environment, the undermining of their occupa-
tions and threats to their continued existence, all emanating from negligent
seismic, excavation and drilling activities, are all collateral damages
accruing from the seizure and assumption of their proprietary rights over
resources they had owned totally when Nigeria started off as a nation
(Owubokiri 2009:19).
Amnesty and Economic Prosperity
Over time, and in the course of the negotiations between government and the
militants over the Niger Delta crisis, the issue of amnesty had been touted. For
1-Niger.pmd 28/09/2013, 16:345
6 AJIA, Volume 13, Numbers 1&2, 2010
instance, on 27 July  2007, when former Governor Dipreye Alamieseigha of
Bayelsa State was released after over two years in detention (he was arrested
on 15 January  2005) on graft charges; the gesture was counted as number
two (next to the release of the leader of the Niger Delta Peoples’ Volunteer
Forces (NDPVF), Alhaji Mujahid Asari Dokubo), out of the three main de-
mands of the militants in order to lay down their arms and dialogue. The third
was the withdrawal of military forces from the region. In between these, the
militants demanded ‘amnesty for those that have been declared wanted so
that they can participate in the process of negotiation’ (Aziken, Usiegbe &
Oyadongha 2007:16).
In fact, the Vice President Jonathan who now heads the Federal
Government Committee on the peace process in the Niger Delta was told
pointedly by some members of the IYLF [Ijaw Youth Leadership Forum]
that the government should grant amnesty to the militants for militancy to
stop (Amaize 2008b:23).
Later added to these was the demand for the release of Henry Okah; firstly
from an Angolan prison and then from Jos prison.
The propriety of the term ‘amnesty’ under the ensuing circumstance is of
no pertinence here even though it has generated a bit of debate as its etymol-
ogy is associated with criminals; which the Niger Delta agitators insist they are
not. For the purpose of this discourse, let its pertinence reside in the search for
peace to secure Nigeria’s political stability and national security. Amnesty here
should be a discerning of a political will to right the wrongs of the past which,
for this article, is more than government embarking on massive development
initiatives in the region, say, in the form of infrastructural development. This
without prejudice to the argument that government could have used high con-
centration of development projects in the Niger Delta region as a deliberate
strategy to achieve peace there such that it would be clear to all that any
restiveness there would be considered criminal and dealt with accordingly. But
government insisted on complete cessation of violence and the creation of an
enabling environment (of peace) as a condition precedent to any genuine
development initiative. This is partly because multinational construction giants
are known to have abandoned contracts awarded to them in the region on the
grounds of insecurity. So, government considered it better to push the am-
nesty agenda, get all the categories of militants to surrender their arms, and then
rehabilitate the militants while government start work on the development projects.
Government’s idea of a post-amnesty programme for the development of
the Niger Delta region rests essentially in ‘engendering enduring infrastructural
and social development in the region’. This is because the problems in the
region are essentially human and development-related. In this vein, the
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Secretary General of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) notes that ‘the challenge is
now for the Federal Government to develop the Niger Delta following the sur-
rendering of arms by the militants’ (Oyadongha 2009b:8). This was just as
the stakeholders in the Niger Delta affairs ‘advised the Federal Government to
immediately embark on massive construction of roads and bridges linking all
the riverine oil communities in the Niger Delta, especially now that the am-
nesty has expired and militants have surrendered their arms’ (Oyadongha
2009c:8).
Upon receiving amnesty, ex-militants ‘were registered and given cards and
have been collecting salaries as ex-militants’ (Nnochiri 2010:20). The Fed-
eral Government Amnesty Committee has continued to dismiss claims that
the Amnesty Programme has failed by citing tangible evidence, among them
the mobilisation of ex-militants for various training programmes in Nigeria and
in overseas institutions. Over 7,000 ex-militants are said to have so far been
allocated to both local and international off-shore training centres since Au-
gust 2010 and 480 of those already trained are awaiting deployment to off-
shore facilities.
Alluding to the success of the Amnesty Programme, President Goodluck
Jonathan in a speech to woo delegates at the Peoples Democratic Party presi-
dential primaries on 13 January 2011 insists that:
If we had not addressed the challenges in the Niger Delta, our oil price
would not have reached the minimum the production dropped below one-
third but now we can produce above the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) quotas (Fabiyi 2011:9).
Thus, while the Amnesty Programme has resulted in relative peace, such that
Nigeria’s oil production which dropped from 2.6 million barrels a day to about
one million at the peak of the unrest between 2006 and 2009 has now risen
to 2.1 million barrels daily, recent upsurge of violence has raised doubts about
the programme’s ability to tame the monster of militancy in the Niger Delta.
The resurgence of violence has even assumed a more frightening dimension.
Post-Amnesty Violence: Nature and Episodes
Many observers who believed the Amnesty Programme would not work were
surprised to see the larger of the militant groups embracing it, handing over
their weapons and accepting ‘a larger share of revenue from the Niger Delta
oilfields in return for suspending their independence struggle’ (Laing 2010:2).
Surprisingly, just when people had come to believe the programme would
succeed after all, remnants of the splinter groups began to sabotage it and to
take the battle sometimes outside the creeks, upland and even to the seats of
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government; and this portends a larger threat to the nation’s security. This
trend first became manifest in the Atlas Cove bombing on the eve of the com-
mencement of Amnesty in 2009. This destroyed the capacity of this major
petroleum products supply and distribution facility that takes petroleum prod-
ucts feedstock from ocean-going vessels and distributes same (Amaize et al
2009:1) from receiving petroleum products. This facility is the source of pe-
troleum products’ distribution to the entire south-west of Nigeria, including
Lagos State, Kwara State and the South South states of Edo and Delta. The
attack, conducted outside the boundaries of the Niger Delta by the Niger Delta
militant group MEND, prompted the then NNPC boss, Mr. Sanusi Barkindo, to
lament thus:
...it is the first time this type of incident has happened in Atlas Cove...
everybody concerned was taken by complete surprise because this facility
had been secured on a twenty-four hour basis, seven days a week...
(Amaize et al 2009:5).
The event left military officers who were safeguarding the station dead, includ-
ing a Navy Commander. The militants who carried out the operation came in
as many as 15 boats early in the evening (8:15 pm), placed dynamites on a
critical angle of the pipelines and blew it up without the Nigerian security
system being astir (Amaize et al 2009:5).
This fits into the contention of Ylonen (2005:53) that ‘these crises illus-
trate the weakness of the Nigerian state [as] they demonstrate the limitations
of the governance structures to overcome challenges to the national govern-
ment before they occur.’ To further underscore the magnitude of the threat
which the activities of the militants posed to the nation’s security, a day after
the militants bombed the Atlas Cove oil facility, President Yar’Adua immedi-
ately changed the Defence Minister. In a minor cabinet reshuffle affecting only
two ministries, the Minister of Interior, Major-General Godwin Abbe a retired
infantry soldier swapped positions with Alhaji Shettima Mustapha who moved
from the Defence Ministry to that of Interior. ‘Given the background of the new
[Defence] Minister’, the call to his new portfolio aimed at ‘fast tracking the
ongoing peace process in the [Niger Delta] region, especially critical issues
that concern defence’ (Idonor 2009:5). One would have expected that the
gravity of the security concerns the Niger Delta crisis has created would com-
pel the federal government’s counter measures to be commensurate with them,
but it all seemed rather cosmetic. By and large, government efforts ended in a
debacle as a full-scale military action between the militants and the military
(JTF) broke out in the Ijaw Gbaramatu creeks. According to Oyadongha:
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What started as mere ill-equipped fighting band in the mangrove swamp
of the Niger Delta has snowballed into a deadly war machine that would
hold the nation by the jugular. From this poorly organised rag tag gang
emerged a disciplined fighting machine using speedboats, machine guns
and rocket propelled grenade launchers to carry out precise attack on
installations in the region. The initial thinking that the military would rout
the rampaging militants in a matter of days turned out to be a mirage
(Oyadongha 2009a:9).
By 4 October 2009 when the Amnesty offer officially ended, several militant
groups had embraced the scheme while a couple (especially the MEND) did
not. This was a sign that militant activities in the region was not completely
over. Post-amnesty militants’ activities continued with upland bombings with
consequential deaths and loss of property. The first of these and which aborted
a post-amnesty dialogue for stake holders in the oil-rich town of Warri oc-
curred on 15 March 2010. Here, two explosions occurred some 200 meters
outside the perimeter fence of the Delta State Government House Annex,
Warri, and the venue of the summit. This facility is the alternate seat of the
government of the oil-rich Delta State after Asaba, the State capital. In at-
tendance at the conference was a former Chief of Defence Staff General
Andrew Owoye Azazi (rtd) who later became the National Security Adviser
(NSA). He had just ended his welcome address as the occasion’s chairman
when the first bomb exploded. Others in the gathering included Dr. Emmanuel
Uduaghan, Governor of the host Delta State; his colleagues: Adams Oshiomole
of Edo State, Ikedi Ohakim of Imo State, Godswill Akpabio of Akwa-Ibom
State, etc. The then acting President, Goodluck Jonathan, was represented by
Ufot Ekaette, the Minister for Niger Delta among other dignitaries. The guests
waived off the first blast and continued with their meeting. But when the sec-
ond bomb went off at 11.15 am ‘with a shattering noise that broke the outer
glass of the hall and shook the building to its foundation’ (Amaize et al 2010:1-
5) the meeting ended abruptly as participants rushed out of the venue. One
death was recorded. MEND claimed responsibility for the bombing.
Episode two happened on Independence Day (1 October 2010) when twin
bomb blasts claimed the lives of 20 people, including eight security agents.
This incident which occurred just about 20 meters away from Eagle Square,
Abuja, the venue of the Independence Day celebrations nearly marred Niger-
ia’s Golden Jubilee function which had a host of Heads of States and other
foreign and national dignitaries in attendance. Like the Warri episode, MEND
claimed responsibility for the bomb blasts. They also claimed to be protesting
against government’s neglect of the Niger Delta (even in the face of the Am-
1-Niger.pmd 28/09/2013, 16:349
10 AJIA, Volume 13, Numbers 1&2, 2010
nesty Programme and the stepped up process of infrastructural development
in the region).
All these events constituted sufficient security breaches that resulted in the
overhauling of the nation’s security structure. The acting National Security
Adviser to the President, Colonel Kayode Are, was dropped and General Andrew
Owoye Azazi (rtd) was appointed in a substantive position. These are all pointers
to the magnitude of the threat which the militants’ activities posed to the
nation’s security (even in the face of Amnesty Programme and the ongoing
development of infrastructure in the Niger Delta region). It would also be re-
called that British intelligence claimed to have detected the Abuja plot in ad-
vance and sent warnings to Nigeria but this did not prevent the attack. That
perhaps explains the absence of the then British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown,
who was billed for a key role. So far, five MEND-related suspects have ap-
peared in court over the Abuja blasts. There were no arrests over Atlas Cove
and Warri.
The United Nations Security Council on 4 October 2010 condemned the
Independence Day bombings as a ‘reprehensible act of terrorism’ and urged
all member-states to cooperate actively with Nigeria to bring the perpetrators
to justice. While insisting that terrorism in whatever form was ‘criminal and
unjustifiable, regardless of the motive’ it ‘stressed the need to combat all
forms of threats to international security caused by terrorist acts’ (Bayagbon
2010c:6).
But these official reactions did not deter the militants nor did they stop their
activities. A bloody gun duel broke out on 18 November 2010 between soldiers
of the JTF and the militants who re-grouped under a post-amnesty group –
The Niger Delta Liberation Force (NDLF) – under ‘General’ John Togo who
repelled the military (Amaize 2010:5). The militants also returned to their old
tactics of vandalising oil installations in order to cripple the economy.
In the renewed and post-amnesty vandalisation of oil installations, MEND
attacked Exxon Mobil facility in Akwa Ibom State on 14 November 2010 while
threatening to resume full attack on oil installations in the Niger Delta. But why
has the Amnesty Programme been unable to assuage restiveness in the Niger
Delta? Government’s expectation over the Amnesty Programme has been largely
met: the militants have renounced violence; they have surrendered their weap-
ons and received government rehabilitation programmes for them. Peaceful
has returned and infrastructural development projects are going apace in the
region. So why couldn’t the new-found peace reign in the region?  It seems
there are still issues that the Amnesty programme has not addressed.
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Causes of the Post-Amnesty Militancy
As earlier indicated, while most of the militant groups keyed into the Amnesty
Programme, surrendered their arms and got their members to renounce mili-
tancy, others (particularly the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger
Delta (MEND) backed out claiming that the Amnesty Programme was not far
reaching enough and that the pace of development of infrastructure in the
Niger Delta was too slow (Bayagbon 2010b:18). MEND ‘neither accepted
amnesty nor surrendered their arms’ (Amaize 2009:5). While claiming re-
sponsibility for the Warri bomb explosion at the venue of Vanguard’s Post-
Amnesty conference, MEND said ‘it was to let the world know of its continued
relevance in the region’ and to further protest the alleged continued
marginalisation of host people from control and management of the resources
of their region ‘which have been distributed among mostly Northerners while
indigenes of the Niger Delta can barely survive’ (Nnadozie 2010:6).
There are also the factors on the part of government – of delayed consid-
erations of the issues that led to the declaration of Amnesty. Thus the renewed
militants’ activities were to provoke the authorities to reconstitute the Amnesty
Implementation Committee to address the specific demands of the ex-mili-
tants  and make those concerned to go back to the drawing board to replan the
Amnesty Programme (Aziken 2010:7). This is so because, as admitted by a
member of the Post-Amnesty Committee, Dr Tony Uranta, ‘the amnesty proc-
ess is a failure.’ In his view, post-amnesty violence like the bomb blast in Warri
has  ‘no intention to hurt people but possibly angry elements still complaining
about the failure of the process of amnesty may need to be engaged’ (Amaize
2010:5&8).
This contention validates MEND’s claim to seek continued relevance and
the need to get the amnesty idea right. This has become imperative given the
contention of the likes of Ann’Kio Briggs that post-amnesty violence ‘shows
very clearly that the Federal Government, the state governments that make up
the Niger Delta, all of them have missed the point of the amnesty’ (Amaize
2010:8). ‘Captain’ Mark Anthony, spokesperson of the NDLF militants said
the resumption of their activities were
to draw Federal Government’s attention to the fact that some of us who
accepted amnesty before were abandoned and that they should dialogue
with us but the JTF came for war... They should call a conference of ex-
militants to know how the amnesty programme is going and take necessary
steps to correct the deficiencies (Amaize 2010:5).
Even from the rehabilitation centres, there have been echoes of protests and
threats to return to violence by ex-militants who have alleged several breaches
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by government authorities of ‘most of the agreements reached between the
Amnesty Committee and the former militants’ (Ahon 2010:9). In this regard,
for instance, a group of former militants at the Sapele Naval Base Rehabilita-
tion Centre had alleged incompetence on the part of the resource person
engaged to train them who ‘was either ill-equipped or was cutting corners’ a
situation that ‘has made them to stay idle in the past three months in the
training camp’ (Ahon 2010:9).
Scepticism over governments commitment towards the Amnesty Programme
were further heightened  by ‘a new definition of oil producing states [which]
includes states through which pipelines for evacuating crude or refined prod-
ucts pass. [As] they are to become beneficiaries of funds [meant] for oil
producing communities’ (Bayagbon 2010a:18). Again, there were specula-
tions during the arms-surrender exercise that not all the arms in the cache of
the militants were turned in. ‘Information has it that not up to 40 per cent of
the war arsenals in their possession was eventually surrendered. So, the inci-
dents you’re getting today are to confirm that they have not totally dis-
armed’ (Ezema 2010:5). Further quoting Ayo Opadokun, Ezema (2010:5)
notes that:
These militants have been busy engaging in bunkering and bunkering
provides them with hard currencies. There is no amount that the Federal
Government can give them on monthly basis that will satisfy them. So each
time they are broke, they will like to do something to create confusion
[and] explore the situation for their own economic gains.
For government, it needed ‘to rid the Niger Delta of criminal elements mas-
querading as militants’ as ‘government would not fold its arms and some
criminals plunge the region into another orgy of violence’. It therefore ‘had the
responsibility to nip in the bud all threats of militancy’ (Amaize 2010:5). Thus
the renewed (post-amnesty) violence derived from the effort of the military to
stem the resurgence of militancy in the region.
Conclusion
 The Amnesty Programme secured for government a new lease to continue to
mine oil resources in the Niger Delta and added legitimacy to the criminal
aspects of the militants’ struggles.  Genuine rights agitations had long slipped
out of the agenda of most of the militant groups. Militant gangs are known to
have rivalled one another for the control of the attention of government and oil
exploring companies who distributed largesse to them to ensure that a
congenial atmosphere prevailed for the continued oil exploitation. A com-
mon saying among the militants while the disarmament was going on was
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‘money for the weapons’, meaning that the disarmament was cash-induced.
If that was so, it also meant that the militants’ struggle was also mercenary.
Government has astutely denied that militants received monetary inducements
to disarm.
Other gang leaders were satisfied with the  euphoria of being considered
temporarily important and to interact with the highest level of power at the
Presidential Villa in Abuja and being put on monthly stipends with further as-
surance  of receiving patronage from government and the oil prospecting com-
panies. Laing (2010) who noted that the militants ‘accepted a larger share of
revenues from the Niger Delta oil fields in return for suspending their inde-
pendence struggle’ maintained that such revenues went into individuals pock-
ets – hence, were loots. It is not expected that such loots would last forever.
They can only be replenished under a crisis-ridden environment. So, the orgy
of war has to resurge. A near-permanent resolution to this trend would be to
institute a true democratic culture which would ensure that powers reside in
the people through an owner-control or at least host participation in the con-
trol of the resources of the Niger Delta – oil and gas. Otherwise the Amnesty
Programme and other similar initiatives would remain mere palliatives.
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